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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in foun-
dational game theory, the Brandenburger - Keisler paradox. We approach
the paradox from two different perspectives: non-well-founded set theory
and paraconsistent logic. We show that the paradox persists in both frame-
works for category theoretical reasons, but, with different properties.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Brandenburg-Keisler paradox (‘BK paradox’, henceforth) is a two-person
self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006).
Due to its considerable impact on the various branches of game theory and logic,
it has gained increasing interest in the literature.
In short, for players Ann and Bob, the BK paradox arises when we consider
the following statement “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that
Bob’s assumption is wrong” and ask the question if “Ann believes that Bob’s
assumption is wrong”.
There can be considered two main reasons why the Brandenburger-Keisler
argument turns out to be a paradox. First, the limitations of set theory presents
some restrictions on the mathematical model which is used to describe self-
referantiality and circularity in the formal language. Second, Boolean logic
comes with its own Aristotelian meta-logical assumptions about consistency.
Namely, Aristotelian principle about consistency, principium contradictionis, main-
tains that contradictions are impossible. In this paper, we will consider some al-
ternatives to such assumptions, and investigate their impact on the BK paradox.
The BK paradox is based on the ZFC set theory. The ZFC set theory comes
with its own restrictions one of which is the axiom of foundation. It can be
deduced from this axiom that no set can be an element of itself. In non-well-
founded set theory, on the other hand, the axiom of foundation is replaced by
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the anti-foundation axiom which leads to, among many other things, genera-
tion of sets which are members of themselves (Mirimanoff, 1917; Aczel, 1988).
Therefore, we claim that switching to non-well-founded set theory suggests a
new approach to the paradox, and game theory in general. The power of non-
well-founded set theory comes from its genuine methods to deal with circularity
(Barwise & Moss, 1996; Moss, 2009).
Second, what makes the BK paradox a paradox is the principium contradictio-
nis. Paraconsistent logics challenge this assumption (Priest, 1998; Priest, 2006).
Therefore, we also investigate the BK paradox in paraconsistent systems. This
line of research, as we shall see, is rather fruitful. The reason for this is the
following. The BK paradox is essentially a self-referential paradox, and similar
to any other paradox of the same kind, it can be analyzed from a category theo-
retical or algebraic point of view (Yanofsky, 2003; Abramsky & Zvesper, 2010).
Moreover, paraconsistent logics also present an algebraic and category theo-
retical structure which makes this approach possible. In this work, we make
the connection between self-referantiality and paraconsistency clearer and see
whether we can solve the paradox if we embrace a paraconsistent framework.
What is the significance of adopting non-classical frameworks then? There
are many situations where circularity and inconsistency are integral parts of
the game. A game when some players can reset the game can be thought of
a situation where the phenomenon of circularity appears. Moreover, inconsis-
tencies occur in games quite often as well. Situations where information sets
of some players become inconsistent after receiving some information in a di-
alogue without a consequent belief revision are such examples where inconsis-
tencies occur (Lebbink et al., 2004; Rahman & Carnielli, 2000).
In this paper, we show that adopting the non-well-founded set theory makes
a significant change in the structure of the paradox. We achieve this by con-
structing counter-models for the BK argument. Second, by paraconsistent logic,
we show that, even when we allow non-trivial inconsistencies the BK argument
can be satisfied in some certain situations. We also use topological products to
give a weak-completeness result generalizing some of the results in the original
paper.
1.2 Related Literature
The Brandenburger - Keisler paradox was presented in its final form in a rel-
atively recent paper in 2006 (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006). This paper was
followed by some further result within the same domain (Brandenburger et al., 2008).
A general framework for self-referential paradoxes was discussed earlier by
Yanofsky in 2003 (Yanofsky, 2003). In his paper, Yanofsky used Lawvere’s cat-
egory theoretical arguments in well-known mathematical arguments such as
Cantor’s diagonalization, Russell’s paradox, and Go¨del’s Incompleteness theo-
rems. Lawvere, on the other hand, discussed self-referential paradoxes in carte-
sian closed categories in his early paper which appeared in 1969 (Lawvere, 1969).
Most recently, Abramsky and Zvesper used Lawvere’s arguments to analyze the
BK paradox in a category theoretical framework (Abramsky & Zvesper, 2010).
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Pacuit approached the paradox from a modal logical perspective and pre-
sented a detailed investigation of the paradox in neighborhood models and
in hybrid systems (Pacuit, 2007). Neighborhood models are used to repre-
sent modal logics weaker than K, and can be considered as weak versions of
topological semantics (Chellas, 1980). This argument later was extended to
assumption-incompleteness in modal logics (Zvesper & Pacuit, 2010).
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of using non-well-founded sets as
Harsanyi type spaces was first suggested by Lismont, and extended later by
Heifetz (Lismont, 1992; Heifetz, 1996). Heifetz motivated his approach by
“making the types an explicit part of the states’ structure”, and hence obtained
a circularity that enabled him to use non-well-founded sets.
Mariotti et al., on the other hand, used compact belief models to represent
interactive belief structures in a topological framework with further topological
restrictions (Mariotti et al., 2005).
Paraconsistent games in the form of dialogical games were largely discussed
by Rahman and his co-authors (Rahman & Carnielli, 2000). Co-Heyting alge-
bras, on the other hand, has gained interest due to their use in “region based
theories of space” within the field of mereotopology (Stell & Worboys, 1997).
Mereotopology discusses the qualitative topological relations between the wholes,
parts, contacts and boundaries and so on.
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, we recall the BK paradox
stated in basic modal language. Then, we consider the matter from non-well-
founded set theoretical point of view. Next, we introduce category theoretical
and topological paraconsistent frameworks to deal with the paradox, and ana-
lyze the behavior of the paradox in such frameworks. Finally, we conclude with
several research directions for future work.
1.3 The Paradox
The BK paradox can be considered as a game theoretical two-person version of
Russell’s paradox where players interact in a self-referential fashion. Let us call
the players Ann and Bob with associated type spaces Ua and U b respectively.
Now, consider the following statement which we call the BK sentence:
Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption
is wrong.
A Russell-like paradox arises if one asks the question whether Ann believes
that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In both cases, we get a contradiction, hence the
paradox. Thus, the BK sentence is impossible.
Brandenburger and Keisler use belief sets to represent the players’ beliefs.
The model (Ua, U b, Ra, Rb) that they consider is called a belief model where
Ra ⊆ Ua × U b and Rb ⊆ U b × Ua. The expression Ra(x, y) represents that
in state x, Ann believes that the state y is possible for Bob, and similarly for
Rb(y, x). We will put Ra(x) = {y : Ra(x, y)}, and similarly for Rb(y). At a state
x, we say Ann believes P ⊆ U b if Ra(x) ⊆ P . Now, a modal logical semantics for
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the interactive belief structures can be given. We use two different modalities
 and ♥ which stand for the belief and assumption operators respectively with
the following semantics.
x |= abϕ iff ∀y ∈ U b.Ra(x, y) implies y |= ϕ
x |= ♥abϕ iff ∀y ∈ U b.Ra(x, y) iff y |= ϕ
Those operators can also be given a modal definition (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006).
An interactive belief frame is a structure (W,P,Ua, U b) with a binary relation
P ⊆ W ×W , and disjoint sets Ua and U b such that (Ua, U b, P a, P b) is a belief
model with Ua∪U b = W , P a = P ∩Ua×U b, and P b = P ∩U b×Ua. Now, for a
given valuation function which assigns propositional variables to subsets ofW ,
the semantics of the belief and assumption modalities are given as follows.
x |= abϕ iff w |= Ua ∧ ∀y(P (x, y) ∧ y |= Ub implies y |= ϕ)
x |= ♥abϕ iff w |= Ua ∧ ∀y(P (x, y) ∧ y |= Ub iff y |= ϕ)
A belief structure (Ua, U b, Ra, Rb) is called assumption complete with respect
to a set of predicates Π on Ua and U b if for every predicate P ∈ Π on U b, there
is a state x ∈ Ua such that x assumes P , and for every predicate Q ∈ Π on Ua,
there is a state y ∈ U b such that y assumes Q. We will use special propositions
U
a and Ub with the following meaning: w |= Ua if w ∈ Ua, and similarly for
U
b. Namely, Ua is true at each state for player Ann, and Ub for player Bob.
Brandenburger and Keisler showed that no belief model is complete for its
first-order language. Therefore, “not every description of belief can be rep-
resented” with belief structures (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006). The incom-
pleteness of the belief structures is due to the holes in the model. A model,
then, has a hole at ϕ if either Ub ∧ ϕ is satisfiable but ♥abϕ is not, or Ua ∧ ϕ
is satisfiable but ♥baϕ is not. A big hole is then defined by using the belief
modality  instead of the assumption modality ♥.
In the original paper, the authors make use of two lemmas before identifying
the holes in the system. These lemmas are important for us as we will challenge
them in the next section. First, let us define a special propositional symbol D
with the following valuation D = {w ∈W : (∀z ∈W )[P (w, z) → ¬P (z, w)]}.
Lemma 1.1 ((Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006)).
1. If ♥abUb is satisfiable, then abbaab♥baUa → D is valid.
2. ¬ab♥ba(Ua ∧D) is valid.
Based on these lemmas, authors observe that there is no complete belief
models. Here, we give the theorem in two forms.
Theorem 1.2 ((Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006)).
• First-Order Version: Every belief model M has either a hole at Ua, a hole at
U b, a big hole at one of the formulas
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(i) ∀x.P b(y, x)
(ii) x believes ∀x.P b(y, x)
(iii) y believes [x believes ∀x.P b(y, x)]
a hole at the formula
(iv) D(x)
or a big hole at the formula
(v) y assumes D(x)
Thus, there is no belief model which is complete for a language L which
contains the tautologically true formulas and formulas (i)-(v).
• Modal Version: There is either a hole at Ua, a hole at Ub, a big hole at one
of the formulas
♥baUa, ab♥baUa, baab♥baUa
a hole at the formula Ua ∧D, or a big hole at the formula ♥ba(Ua ∧D).
Thus, there is no complete interactive frame for the set of all modal formulas
built from Ua, Ub, and D.
2 Non-well-founded Set Theoretical Approach
2.1 Introduction
Non-well-founded set theory is a theory of sets where the axiom of foundation is
replaced by the anti-foundation axiomwhich is due to Mirimanoff (Mirimanoff, 1917).
Decades later, the axiom was re-formulated by Aczel within the domain of
graph theory which motivates our approach here (Aczel, 1988). In non-well-
founded (NWF, henceforth) set theory, we can have true statements such as
‘x ∈ x’, and such statements present interesting properties in game theory.
NWF theories, in this respect, are natural candidates to represent circularity
(Barwise & Moss, 1996).
To the best of our knowledge, Lismont introduced non-well-founded type
spaces to show the existence of universal belief spaces (Lismont, 1992). Then,
Heifetz used NWF sets to represent type spaces and obtained rather sophisti-
cated results (Heifetz, 1996). He mapped a given belief space to its NWF ver-
sion, and then proved that in the NWF version, epimorphisms become equalites.
However, Harsanyi noted earlier that circularity might be needed to express
infinite hierarchy of beliefs.
It seems to me that the basic reason why the theory of games with
incomplete information has made so little progress so far lies in the
fact that these games give rise, or at least appear to give rise, to an
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infinite regress in reciprocal expectations on the part of the players.
In such a game player 1’s strategy choice will depend on what he
expects (or believes) to be player 2’s payoff function U2, as the lat-
ter will be an important determinant of player 2’s behavior in the
game. But his strategy choice will also depend on what he expects
to be player 2’s first-order expectation about his own payoff function
U1. Indeed player 1’s strategy choice will also depend on what he
expects to be player 2’s second-order expectation - that is, on what
player 1 thinks that player 2 thinks that player 1 thinks about player
2’s payoff function U2... and so on ad infinitum.
(Harsanyi, 1967)
Note that Harsanyi’s concern for infinite regress or circularity is related to
the epistemics of the game. However, some other ontological concerns can be
raised as well about the type spaces, and the way we define the states in the
type spaces. In this respect, Heifetz motivated his approach, which is related to
our perspective here, by arguing that NWF type spaces can be used “once states
of nature and types would no longer be associated with states of the world, but
constitute their very definition.” [ibid, (his emphasis)].
This is, indeed, a prolific approach to Harsanyi type spaces to represent
uncertainty. Here is Heifetz on the very same issue.
Nevertheless, one may continue to argue that a state of the world
should indeed be a circular, self-referantial object: A state represents
a situation of human uncertainty, in which a player considers what
other players may think in other situations, and in particular about
what they may think there about the current situation. According to
such a view, one would seek a formulation where states of the world
are indeed self-referring mathematical entities.
(Heifetz, 1996, p. 204).
Notice that BK paradox is a situation where the aforementioned belief in-
teraction among the players plays a central role. Therefore, in our opinion, it
is worthwhile to pursue what NWF type spaces might provide in such situa-
tions. On the other hand, NWF set theory is not immune to the problems that
the classical set theory suffers from. For example, note that Russell’s paradox
is not solved in NWF setting, and moreover the subset relation stays the same
in NWF theory (Moss, 2009). The reason is quite straight-forward. As Heifetz
also noted “Russell’s paradox applies to the collection of all sets which do not
contain themselves, not to the collection of sets which do contain themselves”
(Heifetz, 1996, (his emphasis)). Therefore, we do not expect the BK paradox to
disappear in NWF setting. Yet, NWF set theory will give us many other tools in
game theory. We will also go back to this issue when we use category theoretical
tools.
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2.2 Non-well-founded Belief Models
Let us start with defining belief models in NWF theory. What we call a non-
well-founded model is a tuple M = (W,V ) where W is a non-empty non-well-
founded set (hyperset, for short), and V is a valuation assigning propositional
variables to the elements ofW .
Now, we give the semantics of (basic) modal logic in non-well-founded set-
ting (Gerbrandy, 1999). We use the symbol |=+ to represent the semantical
consequence relation in a NWF model.
M,w |=+ ♦ϕ iff ∃v ∈ w. such thatM, v |=+ ϕ
M,w |=+ ϕ iff ∀v ∈ w. v ∈ w impliesM, v |=+ ϕ
Based on this definition, we can now give a non-standard semantics for the
belief and assumption modalities ij and ♥ij respectively for i, j ∈ {a, b}.
M,w |=+ ijϕ iff M,w |=+ Ui ∧
∀v(v ∈ w ∧M, v |=+ Uj →M, v |=+ ϕ)
M,w |=+ ♥ijϕ iff M,w |=+ Ui ∧
∀v(v ∈ w ∧M, v |=+ Uj ↔M, v |=+ ϕ)
Several comments on the NWF semantics are in order here. First, notice that
this definition of NWF semantics for belief and assumption modalities depend
on the earlier modal definition of those operators given (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006;
Gerbrandy, 1999). Second, belief or assumption of ϕ at a state w is defined in
terms of the truth of ϕ at the states that constitutes w, including possibly w
itself. Therefore, these definitions address the philosophical and foundational
points that Heifetz made about the uncertainty in type spaces. We call a belief
state w ∈ W Quine state if w = {w}. We call a belief state w ∈ W an urele-
ment if it is not the empty set, and it can be a member of a set but cannot have
members. Finally, we call a set A transitive if a ∈ A and b ∈ a, then b ∈ A.
For example consider the model W = {w, v} with V (p) = {w} and V (q) =
{v} with a language with two propositional variables for simplicity. Let us as-
sume that both w and v are Quine states. What does it mean to say that the
player a assumes p at w in NFW belief models? Since w is a Quine state, the
only state it can access is itself. Therefore, the statement w |=+ ♥abp forces
w ∈ Ua ∩ U b, which is impossible since the type spaces of a and b are assumed
to be disjoint. On the other hand, for w ∈ Ua, we have w |=+ ♥abq. Notice
that w |=+ Ua. Moreover, since w is the only member of w, and w 6|=+ Ub,
together with the assumption that w 6|=+ q, we observe that the bicondition is
satisfied. Therefore, Quine states can only assume false statements. Moreover,
they believe in any statements.
Theorem 2.1. Let M = (W,V ) be a NWF belief model with disjoint type spaces
Ua and U b respectively for two players a and b. If w ∈ U i be a Quine state
or an urelement belief state for i ∈ {a, b}, then i assumes ϕ at w if and only if
M,w 6|=+ ϕ. Moreover, i believes in any formula ψ at w.
7
Proof. Let us first start with considering the Quine states.
Without loss of generality, let w ∈ Ua where w is a Quine state. Suppose
w |=+ ♥abϕ. Since w ∈ Ua, w |=+ Ua. Since, w ∈ w, and Ua and U b are
disjoint, we have w 6|=+ Ub. Therefore, since w |=+ ♥abϕ, we conclude w 6|=+ ϕ.
For the converse direction, suppose that w 6|=+ ϕ. Since w ∈ w, and w 6|=+
U
b the biconditional is satisfied. Moreover, since w ∈ Ua, w |= +Ua. Therefore,
w |=+ ♥abϕ.
The proof for the belief operator is immediate for Quine states.
Now, let us consider urelements. Without loss of generality, let w ∈ Ua be
an urelement. Then, w |=+ Ua. For the left-to-right direction, note that since
there is no v ∈ w, the conditional is vacuously satisfied. For the right-to-left
direction, suppose w 6|=+ ϕ. Since, w /∈ w and w 6|=+ Ub, the biconditional is
satisfied again.
The proof for the belief operator is also immediate for urelement belief
states, and thus left to the reader.
This concludes the proof. 
Notice that the proof heavily depends on the fact that the type spaces for the
players are assumed to be disjoint. Let us now see how belief models change
once we allow the intersection of NWF type spaces.
Theorem 2.2. Let M = (W,V ) be a NWF belief model for two players a and b
where Ua and U b is not necessarily disjoint. For a Quine statew, if w |=+ ♥ij⊤ for
i, j ∈ {a, b}, then w ∈ Ua∩U b. In other words, Quine states with true assumptions
belong to the both players.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that Quine state w is in Ua. Suppose
w |=+ ♥ab⊤. Then, we observe w |=+ Ua. Left-to-right direction of the bi-
conditional is immediate. Now, consider the right-to-left direction. Since, ⊤
is satisfied at any state, and w is non-empty (i.e. w ∈ w), we conclude that
w |=+ Ub. Therefore, w ∈ U b. Thus, w ∈ Ua ∩ U b. 
Game theoretical implications of Theorem 2.2 is worth mentioning. From
the standard belief structure’s point of view, Quine states correspond to the
states which are reflexive. In other words, at such a state w, player i considers
w possible for player j. Thus, such a state w is forced to be in the intersection
of the type spaces.
On the other hand, intersecting type spaces do not seem to create a problem
for belief models. To overcome this issue, one can introduce a turn function
from the space of the belief model to the set of players assigning states to play-
ers. The functional definition of this construction necessitates that every state
should be assigned to a unique player. Therefore, the game can determine
whose turn it is at Quine atoms. Additionally, urelements, since they cannot
have elements, are end states in games. At such states, players do not consider
any states possible for the other player.
Now, based on the NWF semantics we gave earlier, it is not difficult to see
that the following formulas discussed in the original paper are still valid as
before if we maintain the assumption of the disjointness of type spaces.
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abUb ↔ Ua, baUa ↔ Ub, abUa ↔ ⊥, baUb ↔ ⊥
Furthermore, the following formulas are not valid as before.
abUb → Ub, abUb → baabUb, abUb → ababUb
However, for the sake of the completeness of our arguments, let us, for the
moment, allow that type spaces may not be disjoint.
Consider a NWF belief model (W,V ) where w = {w} with Ua = U b =
W . In such a model abUa ↔ ⊥ fails, but abUa ↔ ⊤ is satisfied. Similar
observations can be made for baUb ↔ ⊥ and baUb ↔ ⊤. Similarly, all
abUb → Ub, abUb → baabUb, and abUb → ababUb are satisfied in
the aforementioned NWF model.
Thus, following Heifetz’s arguments, we maintain that NWF models with
self-referring states are better candidates to formalize uncertainty in games.
Therefore, based on the above observations, it is now conceivable to imagine a
NWF belief model in which previously constructed standard holes do not exist.
Our aim now is to construct a NWF belief model in which the Lemma 1.1 fails.
For this purpose of us, however, we still maintain the assumption that type space
be disjoint.
As a first step, we redefine the diagonal set in the NWF setting. Recall that,
in the standard case, diagonal set D is defined with respect to the accessibility
relation P which we defined earlier. In NWF case, we will use membership
relation for that purpose.
Definition 2.3. Define D+ := {w ∈ W : ∀v ∈ W.(v ∈ w → w /∈ v)}.
We define the propositional variable D+ as the propositional variable with
the valuation set D+.
Now, we observe how the NWF models make a difference in the context
of the BK paradox. Notice that BK argument relies on two lemmas which we
have mentioned earlier in Lemma 1.1. Now, we present counter-models to
Lemma 1.1 in NWF theory.
Proposition 2.4. In a NWF belief structure, if ♥abUb is satisfiable, then the for-
mula abbaab♥baUa ∧ ¬D+ is also satisfiable.
Proof. Let W = {w, v} with w = {v}, v = {w} where Ua = {w} and U b =
{v}. To maintain the disjointness of the types, assume that neither w nor v is
transitive.
Then, w |=+ ♥abUb since all states in b’s type space is assumed by a at w.
Similarly, v |=+ ♥baUa as all states in a’s type space is assumed by b at v. Then,
w |=+ ab♥baUa. Continuing this way, we conclude, w |=+ abbaab♥baUa.
However, by design, w 6|=+ D+ since v ∈ w and w ∈ v. Thus, the formula
abbaab♥baUa ∧ ¬D+ is satisfiable as well. 
Proposition 2.5. The formula ab♥ba(Ua∧D+) is satisfiable in some NWF belief
structures.
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Proof. Take a non-transitive model (W,V ) with W = {w, v, u, t} where w =
{v, w}, v = {u}, and u = {t} where u /∈ t. Let Ua = {w, u}, and U b = {v, t}.
Now, observe that the formulaUa∧D+ is satisfiable only at u (as w ∈ w, w does
not satisfyUa∧D+). Now, v |=+ ♥ba(Ua∧D+). Finally, w |=+ ab♥baUa∧D+.
Note that even if w ∈ w as w /∈ U b, by definition of the box modality, w satisfies
ab♥baUa ∧D+. 
Therefore, the Lemma 1.1 is refuted in NWF belief models. Notice that
Lemma 1.1 is central in Brandenburger and Keisler’s proof of the incompleteness
of belief structures. Thus, we ask whether the failure of Lemma 1.1 would mean
that there can be complete NWF belief structures. The answer to this question
requires some category theoretical tools that we will introduce in the following
section. For now, we construct a counter-model for Theorem 1.2 in NWF setting.
Consider the following counter-model. Let W = {w, v, u, t, r, s, x, y, z} with
w = {v, w}, v = {u}, u = {t} (u /∈ t), r = {v, t, s, y}, s = {w, u, r, x, z}, x =
{x, s}, y = {y, x}, z = {z, y} where Ua = {w, u, r, x, z} and U b = {v, t, s, y}.
Now, observe the following.
• U ∧D+ is satisfied only at u, since we have w ∈ w, r ∈ s ∧ s ∈ r, x ∈ x
and z ∈ z
• No hole at Ua as s |=+ ♥baUa
• No hole at Ub as r |=+ ♥abUb
• No big hole at ♥baUa as x |=+ ab♥baUa
• No big hole at ab♥baUa as y |=+ baab♥baUa
• No big hole at baab♥baUa as z |=+ abbaab♥baUa
• No hole at Ua ∧D+ as v |=+ ♥ba(Ua ∧D+)
• No big hole at ♥ba(Ua ∧D+) as w |=+ ab♥ba(Ua ∧D+)
The crucial point in the semantical evaluation of big holes is the fact that
the antecedent of the conditional in the definition of the box modality is not
satisfied if some elements of the current states are not in the desired type space.
Therefore, the entire statement of the semantics of the box modality is still
satisfied if the current state has some elements from the same type space. This
helped us to construct the counter-model.
This counter-model shows that Theorem 1.2 with its stated form does not
hold in NWF belief structures. Yet, we have to be careful here. Our counter
model does not establish the fact that NWF belief models are complete. It does
establish the fact that they do not have the same holes as the standard belief
models. We will get back to this question later on, and give an answer from
category theoretical point of view.
Similarly, NWF theory should not be taken as such a revolutionary approach
to epistemic game theory replacing the classical (Kripke) models. Gerbrandy
noted:
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(...)[T]here are many ‘more’ Kripke models than there are possibili-
ties of knowledge structures: each possibly corresponds [to] a whole
class of bisimilar, but structurally different, models. In other words,
a semantics for modal logic in the form of Kripke models has a finer
structure than a semantics in terms of non-well-founded sets.
(Gerbrandy, 1999)
Now, one can ask whether there exists a BK-sentence in NWF framework
that can create a self-referential paradox. In order to answer this question, we
will need some arguments from category theory.
2.3 Games Played on Non-well-founded Sets
Finally, note that the BK paradox is about the belief of the players. However,
we can use NWF sets not only to represent the epistemics of games but also to
represent games themselves in extensive form. As we have emphasized earlier,
Aczel’s graph theoretical approach identifies directed graphs and sets, and this
will be our approach here as well.
Aczel’s Anti-Foundation Axiom states that for each connected rooted di-
rected graph, there corresponds a unique set (Aczel, 1988). Therefore, given
any rooted directed graph, we can construct a game with the set that corre-
sponds to the given graph up to the order of players.
Therefore, now, we can use any directed graphs, not necessarily only trees,
to represent games in extensive form. Clearly, the given graph may have loops
that can create infinite regress, thus creating infinite games. For instance, the
situations in which some players may reset the game, or make a move that can
take the game backward are examples of such games where cyclic representa-
tion in extensive form is needed. The crucial point here is the fact that such a
set/game space exists, and is unique.
Theorem 2.6. For every (labeled) rooted directed connected graph, there corre-
sponds to a unique two-player NWF belief structure up to the permutation of type
spaces, and the order of players.
Proof. Follows directly from the Aczel’s Anti-Foundation axiom. 
Let us illustrate the theorem with a simple example.
Example 2.7. Consider the following labeled, connected directed graph.
u
w
v
RL
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We can now construct the two-player NWF belief structure of this game is as
follows. Put W = {w, v, u} where w = {u, v} and u = {w}. Assume that
Ua = {w}, U b = {u, v} (or any other combination of type spaces). Therefore,
this graph corresponds to the game where Bob can reset the game if Alice plays
L at w.
In conclusion, allowing NWF sets in extensive game representations, we can
express a much larger class of games. Notice that, in this section, we used NWF
theory in the extensive form game representations, too - not only at belief sets.
3 Paraconsistent Approach
Paraconsistent logics can be captured by using several rather strong algebraic,
topological and category theoretical structures. In this chapter, we approach
paraconsistency from such directions, and analyze the BK paradox within para-
consistent logics interpreted in such systems.
3.1 Algebraic and Category Theoretical Approach
A recent work on the BK paradox shows the general pattern of such para-
doxical cases, and gives some positive results such as fixed-point theorems
(Abramsky & Zvesper, 2010). In this section, we instantiate the fixed-point re-
sults of the aforementioned reference to some other mathematical structures
that can represent paraconsistent logics. The surprising result, as we shall see,
is the fact that even if we endorse a paraconsistent logical structure to accom-
modate paradoxes, there exists BK-sentences in such structures.
First, let us recall some facts about paraconsistency. Paraconsistency is the
umbrella term for logical systems where ex contradictione quodlibet fails. Namely,
in paraconsistent logics, for some ϕ, ψ, we have ϕ,¬ϕ 6⊢ ψ.
Endorsing a paraconsistent logic does not mean that all contradictions are
true. It means that some contradictions do not entail a trivial theory, and more-
over absurdity (⊥) always lead to trivial theories. Thus, in paraconsistent logics,
there are some contradictions which are not absurd.
Note that the semantical issue behind the failure of ex contradictione quodli-
bet in paraconsistent systems is the fact that in such logical systems, the exten-
sion of the conjunction of some formulas and their negations may not be the
empty set. Therefore, semantically, in paraconsistent logics, there exist some
states in which a formula and its negation is true.
There are variety of different logical and algebraic structures to represent
paraconsistent logics (Priest, 2002). Co-Heyting algebras are natural algebraic
candidates to represent paraconsistency. We will resort to Co-Heyting alge-
bras because of their algebraic and category theoretical properties which will
be helpful later on.
12
Definition 3.1. Let L be a bounded distributive lattice. If there is a binary
operation⇒: L× L→ L such that for all x, y, z ∈ L,
x ≤ (y ⇒ z) iff (x ∧ y) ≤ z,
then we call (L,⇒) a Heyting algebra.
Dually, if we have a binary operation \ : L× L→ L such that
(y \ z) ≤ x iff y ≤ (x ∨ z),
then we call (L, \) a co-Heyting algebra. We call⇒ implication, \ subtraction.
An immediate example of a co-Heyting algebra is the closed subsets of a
given topological space and subtopoi of a given topos (Lawvere, 1991; Mortensen, 2000;
Bas¸kent, 2011; Priest, 2002). Therefore, we can now use a closed set topology
to represent paraconsistent belief sets within the BK-paradox. Such belief sets,
then, would constitute a Co-Heyting algebra. However, we need to be careful
about defining the negation in such systems.
Both operations⇒ and \ give rise to two different negations. The intuition-
istic negation ¬˙ is defined as ¬˙ϕ ≡ ϕ → 0 and paraconsistent negation ∼ is
defined as ∼ϕ ≡ 1 \ ϕ where 0 and 1 are the bottom and the top elements
of the lattice respectively. Therefore, ¬˙ϕ is the largest element disjoint from
ϕ, and ∼ϕ is the smallest element whose join with ϕ gives the top element 1
(Reyes & Zolgaghari, 1996). In a Boolean algebra both intuitionistic and para-
consistent negations coincide, and give the usual Boolean negation where we
interpret ϕ⇒ ψ as ¬ϕ∨ψ, and ϕ\ψ as ϕ∧¬ψ with the usual Boolean negation
¬. What makes closed set topologies a paraconsistent structure is the fact that
theories that are true at boundary points include formulas and their negation
(Mortensen, 2000; Bas¸kent, 2011). Because, a formula ϕ and its paraconsistent
negation ∼ϕ intersect at the boundary of their extensions. We will discuss the
paraconsistent negation in the following sections as well.
On the other hand, the algebraic structures such, as Co-Heyting algebras,
we have mentioned can be approached from a category theory point of view.
Before discussing Lawvere’s argument, we need to define weakly point surjective
maps. An arrow f : A × A → B is called weakly point surjective if for every
p : A → B, there is an x : 1 → A such that for all y : 1 → A where 1 is the
terminal object, we have
p ◦ y = f ◦ 〈x, y〉 : 1→ B
In this case, we say, p is represented by x. Moreover, a category is cartesian
closed (CCC for short, henceforth), if it has a terminal object, and admits prod-
ucts and exponentiation. A set X is said to have the fixed-point property for a
function f , if there is an element x ∈ X such that f(x) = x. Category theoreti-
cally, an object X is said to have the fixed-point property if and only if for every
endomorphism f : X → X , there is x : 1→ X with xf = x (Lawvere, 1969).
Theorem 3.2 ((Lawvere, 1969)). In any cartesian closed category, if there exists
an object A and a weakly point-surjective morphism g : A → Y A, then Y has the
fixed-point property for g.
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It was observed that CCC condition can be relaxed, and Lawvere’s Theorem
works for categories that have only finite products (Abramsky & Zvesper, 2010)1.
These authors showed how to reduce Lawvere’s Lemma to the BK paradox and,
to reduce the BK paradox to Lawvere’s Lemma2. Now, our goal is to take one
step further, and investigate some other cartesian closed categories which rep-
resent the non-classical frameworks that we have investigated in this paper.
Therefore, by Lawvere and Abramsky & Zvesper results, we will be able to show
the existence of fixed-points in our framework, which will give the BK paradox
in those frameworks.
In their paper, Abramsky & Zvezper, first define the BK sentence by using re-
lations between type spaces instead of maps, and then, represent the Lawvere’s
fixed-point lemma in a relational framework. Then, they conclude that if the
relational representation of the BK sentence satisfies some conditions then they
have a fixed-point, which in turn creates the BK sentence. Their approach makes
use of the standard (classical) BK paradox, and utilizes regular logic in their for-
malization. In our approach, we directly use Lawvere’s Lemma (Theorem 3.2
here) to deduce our results.
Now, we observe the category theoretical properties of co-Heyting algebras
and the category of hypersets. Recall that the category of Heyting algebras
is a CCC. A canonical example of a Heyting algebra is the set of opens of a
topological space (Awodey, 2006). The objects of such a category will be the
open sets. The unique morphisms in that category exists from O to O′ if O ⊆ O′.
What about co-Heyting algebras? It is easy to prove the following.
Proposition 3.3. Co-Heyting algebras are Cartesian closed categories.
Example 3.4. As we have mentioned, the co-Heyting algebra of the closed sets
of a topology is a well-known example of a CCC. Similar to the arguments that
show that open set topologies are CCC, we can observe that closed set topologies
are CCC as well.
Given two objects C1, C2, we define the unique arrow from C1 to C2, if
C1 ⊇ C2. The product is the union of C1 and C2 as the finite union of closed
sets exists in a topology. The exponent CC21 is then defined as Clo(C1 ∩ C2)
where C1 is the complement of C1.
Now, we have the following corollary for Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.5. In a co-Heyting algebra, if there is an object A and a weakly point-
surjective morphism g : A → Y A, then Y has the fixed-point property. Therefore,
there exists a co-Heyting algebraic model with an impossible BK sentence.
This is interesting. In other words, even if we allow nontrivial inconsisten-
cies and represent them as a co-Heyting algebra, we will still have fixed-points.
This is our first step to establish the possibility of having the BK paradox in
paraconsistent setting.
1This point was already made by Lawvere and Schanuel in Conceptual Mathematics. Thanks to
Noson Yonofsky for pointing this out.
2In order to be able to avoid the tecnicalities of categorical logic, we do not give the detalis of
their construction and refer the reader to (Abramsky & Zvesper, 2010)
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Corollary 3.6. There exists a paraconsistent belief model in which the BK paradox
persists.
Proof. The procedure is relatively straight-forward. Take a paraconsistent belief
modelM where belief sets constitute a closed set topology. Such a topology is a
co-Heyting algebra which is a CCC. Therefore, Lawvere’s Lemma (Theorem 3.2)
applies. Since Lawvere’s Lemma is reducible to the BK sentence by Abramsky &
Zvesper ’s result, we observe thatM possesses a fixed-point that creates the BK
sentence. 
This simple result shows that even if we allow some contradictions, there
will exists a BK sentence. This is perhaps not surprising. As Mariotti et al.
pointed out earlier, interactive belief models can produce situations which are
not expressible in the language (Mariotti et al., 2005)3.
In our earlier discussion, we have presented some counter-models for the
classical BK sentence. However, we haven’t concluded that NWF models are
complete. We need Lawvere’s Lemma to show that NWF belief models cannot
be complete. Consider the category AFA of hypersets with total maps between
them4. Category AFA admits a final object 1 = {∅}. Moreover, it also admits ex-
ponentiation and products in the usual sense, making it a CCC. Thus, Lawvere’s
Lemma applies.
Corollary 3.7. There exists an impossible BK sentence in non-well-founded inter-
active belief structures.
3.2 Topological Approach
Now, we make it explicit how paraconsistent topological belief models are con-
structed. In our construction, we will make use of relational representation of
belief models which in turn produces belief and assumption modalities. We will
then interpret those modalities over paraconsistent topological models.
Some topological notions play an essential role in some paraconsistent log-
ics and algebraic structures. In an early paper, Lawvere pointed out the role of
boundary operator in co-Heyting algebras (Lawvere, 1991). In a similar fash-
ion, boundaries play an essential role to give topological semantics for paracon-
sistent logics (Goodman, 1981; Mortensen, 2000; Bas¸kent, 2011). Similarly,
co-Heyting algebras have been used in theories of regions and sets of regions
(Stell & Worboys, 1997). In the original BK paper where the paradox is first in-
troduced, the authors discussed several complete models including topologically
complete models (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006). Their topological space, in
this framework, is compact metrizable space satisfying several further condi-
tions. Our approach, however, does not depend on the topological space per se,
3In their work, however, Mariotti et al. makes the same point by resorting Cantor’s diagonal
arguments. Therefore, either using CCC or Cantor’s diagonlization, a pattern for such self-referential
paradoxes is visible (Yanofsky, 2003).
4Thanks to Florian Lengyel for pointing this out.
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but rather depends first on the logical framework we use, and then the topolog-
ical space in which we interpret such a logical system.
In the topological semantics for modal logic, topological interior Int and clo-
sure Clo operators are identified with  and ♦ operators respectively. Then,
the extension [·] of a modal formula is given as follows [ϕ] := Int([ϕ]). In
the classical setting, in general, opens or closed sets are produced by the modal
operators. Thus, the extensions of Booleans may or may not be topologically
open or closed. Now, we can take one step further, and stipulate that the exten-
sion of the propositional variables to be closed sets as well. Negation operator
is not that straightforward in this case as the negation of a closed set is open.
Therefore, we define negation ∼ as the closure of the complement. Then, we
obtain a co-Heyting algebra of closed sets as we have observed in Example 3.4.
In this setting, inconsistent theories are the ones that include the formulas that
are true at the boundaries (Mortensen, 2000; Bas¸kent, 2011)5.
We now step by step construct the BK argument in paraconsistent topological
setting. We will call such a belief model a paraconsistent topological belief model.
For the agents a and b, we have a corresponding non-empty type spaceA and
B, and define closed set topologies τA and τB on A and B respectively. Further-
more, in order to establish connection between τA and τB to represent belief in-
teraction among the players, we introduce additional constructions tA ⊆ A×B,
and tB ⊆ B×A. We then call the structure F = (A,B, τA, τB, tA, tB) a paracon-
sistent topological belief model. In this setting, the set A represents the possible
epistemic states of the player a in which she holds beliefs about player b, or
about b’s beliefs etc, and vice versa for the set B and the player a. Moreover,
the topologies represent those beliefs. For instance, for player a at the state
x ∈ A, tA returns a closed set in Y ∈ τB ⊆ ℘(B). In this case, we write tA(x, Y )
which means that at state x, player a believes that the states y in Y ∈ τB are
possible for the player b, i.e. tA(x, y) for all y ∈ Y . Moreover, a state x ∈ A
believes ϕ ⊆ B if {y : tA(x, y)} ⊆ ϕ. Furthermore, a state x ∈ A assumes ϕ if
{y : tA(x, y)} = ϕ. Notice that in this definition, we identify logical formulas
with their extensions.
The modal language which we use has two modalities representing the be-
liefs of each agent. Akin to some earlier modal semantics for the paradox, we
give a topological semantics for the BK argument in paraconsistent topological
belief models (Brandenburger & Keisler, 2006; Pacuit, 2007). Let us first give
the formal language which we use. The language for the logic topological belief
models is given as follows.
ϕ := p | ∼ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | a | b | ⊞a | ⊞b
where p is a propositional variable, ∼ is the paraconsistent topological nega-
tion symbol which we have defined earlier, and i and ⊞i are the belief and
assumption operators for player i, respectively.
5If we stipulate that the extension of the propositional variables to be open sets, we obtain
intuitionistic logic with intuitionistic negation. Thus, the duality of intuitionistic and paraconsistent
logics is rather clear in the topological semantics.
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We have discussed the semantics of the negation already. For x ∈ A, y ∈ B,
the semantics of the modalities are given as follows with a modal valuation
attached to F .
x |= aϕ iff ∃Y ∈ τB with tA(x, Y ) → ∀y ∈ Y.y |= ϕ
x |= ⊞aϕ iff ∃Y ∈ τB with tA(x, Y ) ↔ ∀y ∈ Y.y |= ϕ
y |= bϕ iff ∃X ∈ τA with tB(y,X)→ ∀x ∈ X.x |= ϕ
y |= ⊞bϕ iff ∃X ∈ τA with tB(y,X)↔ ∀x ∈ X.x |= ϕ
We define the dual modalities ♦a and ♦b as usual.
Now, we have sufficient tools to represent the BK sentence in our paracon-
sistent topological belief structure with respect to a state x0:
x0 |= a ⊞b ϕ ∧ ♦a⊤
Let us analyze this formula in our structure. Notice that the second conjunct
guarantees that for the given x0 ∈ A, there exists a corresponding set Y ∈ τB
with tA(x, Y ). On the other hand, the first conjunct deserves closer attention:
x0 |= a ⊞b ϕ iff ∃Y ∈ τB with tA(x0, Y )⇒ ∀y ∈ Y. y |= ⊞bϕ
iff ∃Y ∈ τB with tA(x0, Y )⇒
[∀y ∈ Y, ∃X ∈ τA with tB(y,X)⇔ ∀x ∈ X. x |= ϕ]
Notice that in our framework, some special x can satisfy falsehood ⊥ to give
x0 |= a ⊞b ⊥ ∧ ♦a⊤ for some x0. Let the extension of p be X0. Pick x0 ∈ ∂X0
where ∂(·) operator denotes the boundary of a set ∂(·) = Clo(·)− Int(·). By the
assumptions of our framework X0 is closed. Moreover, by simple topology ∂X0
is closed as well. By the second conjunct of the formula in question, we know
that some Y ∈ τB exists such that tA(x0, Y ). Now, for all y in Y , we make an
additional supposition and associate y with ∂X0 giving tB(y, ∂X0). We know
that for all x ∈ ∂X0, we have x |= p as ∂X0 ⊆ X0 where X0 is the extension of
p. Moreover, x |= ∼p for all x ∈ ∂X0 as ∂X0 ⊆ (∼X0), too. Thus, we conclude
that x0 |= a ⊞b ⊥ ∧ ♦a⊤ for some carefully selected x0.
In this construction, we have several suppositions. First, we picked the ac-
tual state from the boundary of the extension of some proposition (ground or
modal). Second, we associate the epistemic accessibility of the second player to
the same boundary set. Namely, a’s beliefs about b includes her current state.
Now, the BK paradox appears when one substitutes ϕ with the following
diagonal formula (whose extension is a closed set by definition of the closed set
topology), hence breaking the aforementioned circularity:
D(x) = ∀y.[tA(x, y)→ ∼tB(y, x)]
The BK impossibility theorem asserts that, under the seriality condition, there is
no such x0 satisfying the following.
x0 |= a ⊞b D(x) iff ∃Y ∈ τB with tA(x0, Y ) ⇒
[∀y ∈ Y, ∃X ∈ τA with tB(y,X)⇔
∀x ∈ X. x |= ∀y′.(tA(x, y′) → ∼tB(y′, x))]
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Motivated by our earlier discussion, let us analyze the logical statement in
question. Let X0 satisfy the statement tA(x, y
′) for all y′ ∈ Y and x ∈ X0 for
some Y . Then, ∂X0 ⊆ X0 will satisfy the same formula. Similarly, let ∼X0
satisfy ∼tB(y′, x) for all y′ ∈ Y and x ∈ X0. Then, by the similar argument,
∂(∼X0) satisfy the same formula. Since ∂(X0) = ∂(∼X0), we observe that
any x0 ∈ ∂X0 satisfy tA(x, y′) and ∼tB(y′, x) with the aforementioned quan-
tification. Thus, such an x0 satisfies a ⊞b D(x). Therefore, the states at the
boundary of some closed set satisfy the BK sentence in paraconsistent topolog-
ical belief structures. Thus, this is a counter-model for the BK sentence in the
paraconsistent topological belief models.
Theorem 3.8. The BK sentence is satisfiable in some paraconsistent topological
belief models.
Proof. See the above discussion for the proof which gives a model that satisfies
the BK sentence. 
3.3 Product Topologies
In the previous section, we introduced tA and tB to represent the belief inter-
action between the players. However, topological models provide us with some
further tools to represent such an interaction (Gabbay et al., 2003).
In this section, we use product topologies to represent belief interaction
among the players. Novelty of this approach is not only to economize on the
notation and the model, but also to present a more natural way to represent
the belief interaction. For our purposes here, we will only consider two-player
games, and our results can easily be generalized to n-player. Here, we make use
of the constructions presented in some recent works (van Benthem et al., 2006;
van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004).
Definition 3.9. Let a, b be two players with corresponding type space A and B.
Let τA and τB be the (paraconsistent) closed set topologies of respective type
spaces. The product topological paraconsistent belief structure for two agents
is given as (A×B, τA × τB).
In this framework, we assume that the topologies are full on their sets -
namely
⋃
τA = A, and likewise for B. In other words, we do not want any
non-expressibility results just because the given topologies do not cover such
states. If the topologies are not full, we can reduce the given space to a subset
of it on which the topologies are full.
In this setting, if player a believes proposition P ⊆ B at state x ∈ A, we
stipulate that there is a closed set X ∈ τA such that x ∈ X and a closed set
Y ∈ τB with Y ⊆ P , all implying X × Y ∈ τA × τB. Player a assumes P if
Y = P , and likewise for player b. Similar to the previous section, we make
use of paraconsistent topological structures with closed sets and paraconsistent
negation.
Borrowing a standard definitions from topology, we say that given a set S ⊆
A × B, we say that S is horizontally closed if for any (x, y) ∈ S, there exists a
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closed setX with x ∈ X ∈ τA and X×{y} ⊆ S. Similarly, S is vertically closed if
for any (x, y) ∈ S, there exists a closed set Y with y ∈ Y ∈ τB, and {x}×Y ⊆ S
(van Benthem et al., 2006; van Benthem & Sarenac, 2004). In this framework,
we say player a at x ∈ A is said to believe a set Y ⊆ B if {x} × Y is vertically
closed.
Now, we define assumption-complete structures in product topologies. For a
given language L for our belief model, let La and Lb be the families of all subsets
ofA and B respectively. Then, we observe that by assumption-completeness, we
require every non-empty set Y ∈ Lb is assumed by some x ∈ A, and similarly,
every non-empty set X ∈ La is assumed by some y ∈ B.
We can now characterize assumption-complete paraconsistent topological
belief models. Given type spaces A and B, we construct the coarsest topologies
on respective type spaces τA and τB where each subset of A and B are in τA and
τB. Therefore, it is easy to see that A × B is vertically and horizontally closed
for any S ⊆ A × B. Moreover, under these conditions, our belief structure in
question is assumption-complete.
We can relax some these conditions. Assume that now τA and τB are not
the coarsest topologies on A and B respectively. Therefore, we define, we weak
assumption-completeness for a topological belief structure if every set S ∈ A×B
is both horizontally and vertically closed. In other words, weak assumption-
complete models focus only on the formula that are available in the given struc-
ture. There can be some formulas expressible in L, but not available in La or in
τA for some reasons. Epistemic game theory, indeed, is full of such cases where
players may or may not be allowed to send some particular signals, and some
information may be unavailable to some certain players. The following theorem
follows directly from the definitions.
Theorem 3.10. LetM = (A×B, τA×τB) be a product topological paraconsistent
belief model. IfM is horizontally and vertically closed, then it is weak assumption-
complete.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented two non-classical frameworks to formalize beliefs in
games. Non-well-founded sets, among many other things, enabled us to use a
larger collection of graphs to represent circular games where some players may
reset the games, and possibly loop around themselves6. Paraconsistent logic, on
the other hand, gave us the tools to represent inconsistent beliefs of the players.
Paraconsistency presents a rather interesting framework for game theory
(Rahman & Carnielli, 2000). Therefore, a possible next step in this direction
would be to present a paraconsistent epistemic game theory where the knowl-
edge sets of the agents may be inconsistent. Our work so far has lead us to
consider paraconsistent belief sets in games where the belief sets of players may
contain contradictions without leading to triviality so that we can still make
6Under the absence of rationality, perhaps.
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meaningful inferences7. Then, the question is the following: “What does it
mean to make an inconsistent move?” Dialogical games seems to provide some
answers to this question (Rahman & Carnielli, 2000).
Moreover, from a logical perspective, paraconsistency has its dual intuition-
istic form where the belief sets of the agents maybe incomplete or paracomplete.
Therefore, for some player i, there can be a formula ϕ for which neither ϕ nor
its negation is believed by any player. This is an intriguing aspect for game
where players simply do not know what to play. The concept of empty move
may seem meaningful for such issues.
Our work raises the question of paraconsistent games. In this work, we
focused on the paraconsistent belief sets, but one can very well start with perfect
information games with non-classical probabilities. In such cases, sum of the
probabilities of playing a and not-a may be higher than 1(Williams, 2011)8.
Therefore, we conclude that aforementioned non-classical frameworks pro-
vide a richer framework to analyze issues in foundational and epistemic game
theory, and further work on the subject will shed some light on the paradoxes
within the field.
Acknowledgements Thanks to Florian Lengyel, Rohit Parikh, Graham Priest,
Noson Yonofsky.
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